Abstract: This essays looks at the diversity of approaches used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its politicization of religions. It first provides an overview of continuity with past practices by the Chinese state in the imperial and republican eras to stress the undetermined nature of ideological change in China. Then, it looks at the mechanisms by which the CCP makes religion a political issue and a matter of public concern within broader agendas. It stresses that this politicization of religions has unfolded in two different ways since 1949: besides the negative and coercive approach of the authorities, positive and cooperative strategy are also implemented. The regime hopes religions will be active politically to promote its objectives, such as projecting abroad an image of China's soft power, raising funds for philanthropic activities within China, or supporting the state 'patriotic' agenda. The actions by the CCP suggest that it does not look at all religions as equally valuable to serve its political objectives, as it still maintains a distinction between official and banned religions. The article documents that the state's encouragement to the revival of some religious activities is selective but on the other hand that CCP views are more nuanced than outsiders assume.
continued during Hu Jintao's leadership when the CCP sponsored, with the help of united front organizations, international conferences promoting Chinese Buddhism and Taoism. 7 The Xi Jinping administration so far maintains this approach, as official support in 2014 for international conferences about Taoism and Buddhism on Chinese soil suggests. I focus in this essay on the religious dimension of this politicization of tradition and argue that the politicization of religion as a positive force in Chinese society does not herald a move towards the adoption of a liberal policy on religious practice: there is resistance to the latter among many cadres in the party, because many still harbor fears about religion as a possible threat to the regime. Officially, the views on religion propagated by the CCP have changed since the Cultural Revolution from a wholesale attack on religious institutions and all kinds of religious beliefs and rituals -dismissed as feudal superstition (fengjian mixin 封建迷信) -to the current celebration of religions as part of Chinese cultural tradition. 8 This essay agrees with most of the recent conclusions reached in research about the legislation of religion in China that we cannot interpret existing regulations and laws as the implementation of the state's liberal neutrality towards all religions, but rather, as a deepening of government control. 9 The simultaneous celebration of religious diversity by the CCP and the ongoing surveillance of religion by its controlling apparatus begs the question: what sense can we make of these contradictory actions? In this essay I argue that contrary to what a commitment to Marxism-Leninism would lead one to expect, the CCP's guidance on religious affairs relies on an understanding of China's religious complexity. This implies that far from basing its policies on the idea of the withering away of religion, it looks at religion as long-lasting and therefore it is mindful of its potential as a resource or a threat. 10 To buttress this argument, the essay first outlines the CCP policy disparities on religion. Then, it will review the evolution of the CCP policies on religious affairs to underline how the idea of religion's complexity has contributed to shape policies. 10 The cooperative/coercive binary I use to describe the relations between the CCP and religions must be understood as extremes in a continuum, with the middle ground being negotiation.
Politicization of Religion by the CCP

A diversity of policies
The politicization of religion by the CCP takes many forms. On the one hand, there is a mobilization of religious associations to serve many of the regime's objectives, most visibly in the area of social service provision and philanthropy, 11 but also in the development of tourism, 12 the promotion of China's soft power abroad, 13 and the campaign to promote public morality. 14 This relatively positive appreciation of religion by the state must be seen as part and parcel of a broader campaign that links together the fate and renewal of Chinese tradition to the legitimacy of the CCP leadership. 15 On the other hand, the politicization of religion in contemporary China by the regime also betrays its concerns about the subversive potential of religion in the political sphere. For example, the state cracks down against specific forms of religious activities that it considers illegal, such as "evil cults" (xiejiao 邪教) accused of "harming society", 16 and against unregistered churches. Even for religions that are recognized by the state such as Protestant Christianity and Catholicism, authorities monitor their activities very tightly and prohibit worship outside of religious venues. Finally, for government authorities in the autonomous regions populated by Muslim Uyghur and Tibetan Buddhists, religious affairs are "securitized" in campaigns against "extremism", "separatism", and "terrorism". The politicization of religion results from the CCP policies on "religious work" (zongjiao gongzuo 宗教工作). These policies ensure that religious institutions and believers comply with its directives and help it achieve its goals of social stability maintenance, social services delivery, local economic development, etc. This work also includes the most specific goal of monitoring the 11 For an example of official support for that policy, see the statement by the vice-chair of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) for the Shenzhen City Party Committee, in Yao s.a. 12 See the endorsement of that position from the chair of the UFWD for the Wuxi City Party Committee, in Zhou 2010: 4. 13 On this topic see Xu/Zou 2014: 7-25 . 14 Zhongyang tongzhanbu wangzhang 中央统战部网章, 2002. 15 This was made quite clear by many signposts displayed throughout Beijing in the summer of 2014, with slogans such as "Nurture and promote core socialist values on the basis of traditional Chinese culture" (立足中华优秀传统文化，培育和弘扬社会主义核心价值观 Lizu Zhonghua youxiu chuantong wenhua, peiyu he hongyang shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) ostensibly making the connection between the CCP's values and traditional culture. 16 Authorities have spent considerable energies establishing the China Anti-Cult Association, a research organization with its own website and branches all over the country, which convenes conferences whose sole purpose is to criticize the target of its activities. See CACA, 2014. For a critique of this approach, see Zhu 2010. development of religious associations and offering guidance to religious leaders about what they need to do to meet government's objectives. This politicization of religion obviously entails a cooperative dimension, when the state mobilizes religious actors to support its objective, but it can also include a coercive dimension, when the state believes that religious actors oppose its directives.
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This dual aspect of the politicization affects all forms of religion in China, not only the five officially recognized religions, albeit unequally and in different ways.
18 Some forms of religion benefit from a more cooperative relation with the politicization of Buddhism through measures such as the rebuilding of temples and the support to their charity does not always yield the outcome of unquestioning obedience to the regime desired by the CCP. The CCP has also encouraged the growth and renewal of Taoism, for example by supporting the organization of a major Taoist international conference in 2011. 28 The visibility of that support is less apparent than the mobilization of Buddhist associations orchestrated by the CCP, but this may result from the fact that there are fewer adherents of Taoism than there are of Buddhism. 29 On the other hand, Taoism is a religion without major doctrinal differences cross-cutting ethnic cleavages, the way the differences between the Mahayana, Tibetan, and Theravada traditions almost reproduce the ethnic cleavages between Han Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities. 30 Some Taoists are non-Han Chinese, but their number is small, and they are not found among the minorities that have grievance over their culture, such as the Tibetans, the Uyghurs, and the Mongols. Taoists also do not suffer from controversies over religious authority that put them at odds with the CCP the way Buddhism and Catholicism do, with religious leaders residing abroad claiming authority over their followers in China. The CCP also politicizes the three other official religions, but this time the emphasis on the coercive dimension is more important than is the case with Buddhism and Taoism. The CCP ostensibly claims to prefer a cooperative approach to Christianity and Islam, but the coercive dimension of its politicization, enforced in particular by the police and security apparatus, is likely to be felt more strongly for people who profess minority religions, all the more so because they live in a society where the state professes the superiority of its atheist orientation. The rationale for the coercive dimension differs whether it is directed at Christians, both Protestant or Catholics, or Muslims: the CCP expresses concern over what it sees as the attempts by Christian missionaries to destabilize society via evangelism, and fears the spread of violence by extremists and terrorists among the latter. The rhetorical construction of Christian and Muslim "threats" includes appeal to nationalism that denounce the connection between Christians and "foreign infiltration on campus", 31 on the one hand, and denunciation of Muslim as "terrorists", 32 on the other. 
Politicization of Religion by the CCP
Examples of the coercive dimension in the politicization of religion in relation to Christianity abounds: the most recent ones in 2014 were the campaign against churches in Zhejiang because crosses atop them were deemed too big, and the continuing crackdown in Beijing against the Shouwang Church, whose leaders have been under house arrest since 2011. 33 There is a widespread perception among officials, which was conveyed to me over the years in many interviews, that the state is "worried" by the growth of Christian churches. For different reasons, the CCP policies towards Muslims under Xi Jinping have taken a turn towards more intransigence, for example with directives preventing the observance of the Ramadan, under the pretext of fighting against "extremism".
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This time the fear is not so much a growth of conversions to Islam, but the possibility of separatism among Uyghurs. 35 These tensions should not leave us with the impression that the CCP has adopted a one-sided and coercive politicization of Christianity and Islam. Cooperation between the government and Christians -Protestants and Catholics alike -exists, and despite the occurrences mentioned before, many Christians worship without too much state interference in local churches, including the Protestant "house churches" and the Catholic churches "loyal" to Rome. 36 The engagement in charity has also contributed in no small part to good relations between the regime and Muslim organizations.
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The politicization of religion in China, whether cooperative or coercive, does not stop with the CCP united front work in relation to the five recognized religions or the more tense relations with the non-recognized "cults". It also affects religions recognized as "world religions", by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of World Religions, such as Judaism, Mormonism, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and Baha'ism. In some cases, local governments have ensured places of worship in large cities where foreign adherents of these religions are likely to worship. 38 The cooperative politicization of religion also benefits other forms of religious practices and worship that have not received official recognition and that are not institutionalized, known as "popular beliefs" (minjian xinyang 民间信仰), but which are increasingly receiving some forms of consideration from the authorities as "intangible (feiyi 非遗) heritage".
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The CCP adopts the same attitude with respect to other religions that have many followers in Taiwan and in the global Chinese diaspora. Hence, although the state does not recognize Yiguandao (一贯道), a religion hugely popular in Taiwan, its followers can find accommodation to their worship in some temples registered as Buddhist or Taoist.
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The lack of regal recognition for Yiguandao naturally brings back to mind the issue of institutionalized religions that are not legalized, many of which the regime denounces as "evil cults". In the case of movements such as Falungong and the Church of Almighty God, the state has clearly politicized them negatively, as a "cult" that seeks to undermine the regime, in the case of the former, or as part of a sinister plot abetted by foreign hostile forces, in the case of the latter. 41 There are other groups among the un-recognized religious institutions existing in China, however, which the state tolerates. Besides the unrecognized branches of existing religions and unrecognized world religions mentioned before, a variety of religious phenomena exist that do not fit with the categories mentioned so far, some of which have emerged before the founding of the PRC, such as the religions of the ethnic minorities, and the teachings of "spiritual masters" and "religious entrepreneurs". 42 One example of the latter is Li Juming 李居明, a lay Buddhist based in Hong Kong, who claims expertise in divination and other Taoist techniques. Not part of any official association, he remains nonetheless accepted in the Chinese religious landscape, even if he has promoted practices that until recently were criticized as superstitious (mixin 迷信).
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We cannot take for granted this tolerance, however, as the case of Shi Jingkong 释凈空 illustrates. A Buddhist monk born in China but living abroad, he stands accused of heading a cult and faces a ban on his entry.
44
The status of Confucianism as a religion represents another instance wherein the cooperative politicization of religion is possible, but difficult to State officials and CCP cadres are more likely to feel comfortable promoting Confucianism if they think it is an ethical system than a religious belief. If they had chosen to turn Confucianism into a religion, the contradiction between their professed atheism and the promotion of religion, already compromised with the promotion of Buddhism and Taoism, would be even more acute. The ongoing debates on the religious nature of Confucianism remain intertwined with the revival of popular beliefs and some of the unrecognized religious institutions.
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Speculations on China's "sixth religion" are unlikely to bear fruit, however, as "popular beliefs" are not likely to be officially recognized soon. 48 We need to keep four caveats in mind when looking at the politicization of religion by the CCP. First, it should not be exaggerated: it also builds on an attitude of indifference towards religion by the majority of the population in Chinese society, if we are to believe what citizens of that country tell social scientists who survey them on their religious beliefs. 49 The regime remains committed to its goal of promoting atheist education and on the surface it appears to have succeeded at instilling this world-view to the population. Religion is far less visible in the Chinese media than in their Taiwanese counterparts.
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Secondly, not all of the five religions are equal in the eyes of government officials. 51 As we have seen above, some party cadres worry about the growth and development of Christianity in the area they rule, and would prefer the growth of Buddhism to pre-empt the former's.
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Thirdly, the state's positive acceptance of some forms of religions is conditional on meeting a host of regulatory requirements that are not clearly defined and vary across the country. In other words, even religious associations that belong to one of the five religions recognized by the state may face different treatment from one province to another, depending on the local laws on religious affairs. 53 For example, as we have seen above, Protestant churches in
Zhejiang have suffered persecution in the Spring in 2014, but provincial governments in neighboring provinces did not undertake similar campaigns. Finally, a constant in all policy changes implemented by the CCP remains in force, at least in theory: 54 aspirant party cadres must profess to be atheists. As many positions in government need to be filled by CCP members, this means a systematic discrimination against religious believers in the full participation to public life. The observations made above of the CCP's complex and multi-faceted politicization of religion reveals that the party's approach to religion is much more complicated than assumed abroad and cannot be limited to a dogmatic adoption of atheism as the 'sole criterion of the truth.' 55 In the next section, I
will show how much this complexity results from the evolution of internal deliberations about how the CCP should relate to religion. These debates, as well as the existence of a cooperative relationship with some religious actors and the perception that some religions are a threat to the regime, reveal that far from adopting a doctrinaire view of religion as irrelevant to Chinese society, the CCP has a long time ago seen its importance.
52 This was repeatedly reported by colleagues in conferences on religion in China. 53 Tong 2010, 381-384. 54 Party cadres always remind outsiders that it is a requirement, and non-party members scoff at the idea that a party cadre could have any religious sympathy. However, as the Falungong affair and numerous case studies of communal religions show, these rigid requirements are broken at the breach, and all the more so when the practices of communal religions or new religious movements do not meet the rigid definition of religion the party promotes. For an example on the latter issue, see Bruun (2003 The politicization of religion under Xi Jinping, in its regulatory dimension, continues this approach, albeit CCP intellectuals, and others, would no doubt reject the idea that China today is a religious state. In the CCP's ideology, "scientific atheism" that represents the intellectual foundation of its view on religion stands above, and beyond, religious truth, in the same way that the CCP, as a "vanguard organization", stands above, and beyond, the law. The CCP sees in its atheist position the confluence of three different trends. The most important is the adherence to "scientific Marxism", as a philosophical system, a mode of existence, and a principle of social organization. The two other ones come from different philosophical traditions: the enlightenment tradition of 56 Goossaert/Palmer 2011. 57 The first two persecutions occurred during the Northern Zhou Dynasty, in 574 and 577, the third one in 845 during the Tang Dynasty, and the last one in 955 during the Late Zhou Dynasty. Buddhism survived these persecutions as a tolerated religion but never regained the preeminence it had acquired under the Tang before the persecution during the reign of emperor Wuzong (840-846). 58 For an example of state persecution against a sect, see Kuhn 1990 . Western philosophy, as well as China's own tradition of atheism, as embodied by Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) and Guanzi 管子. 60 The CCP can count on some support outside the party to promote that view. Hence, the Society for the study of atheism (Zhongguo wushenlun xuehui 中国无神论学会), which claims to represent atheists in China, has founded in 1999 a journal, Science and Atheism (Kexue wushenlun 科学无神论), that is exclusively dedicated to the critique of religion from the perspective of philosophy, and targets in particular "evil cults" and "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin 封建迷信).
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In marked contrast to European governments adopting a posture of official secularism in their institutions through constitutional provisions enshrining freedom of conscience and granting legal recognition without paying attention to religious doctrine, the CCP shows a lot of interest for religion, which stems from many sources. The CCP views on religion rest, naturally, on the specific worldviews adopted by the CCP early on, premised on the materialist perspective of Karl Marx about the withering away of religion, as well as the views of Lenin about the means which the state should use to hasten this fate. However, the situation of China differs in many respects from that of Russia and the European countries where the state faced one or two major religious organizations. As seen above, since the 9th century, China has no single religious institution whose influence and material resources could match those of the state, but rather a centuries-old tradition in which political and religious authority resided at the apex of the state. As research on the resilience of popular beliefs shows, the CCP has failed totally to eradicate the world-view that gods and ancestors can shape this world. 62 As a result, its view on religion also takes into account the latter's revolutionary potential, as evidenced in the past history of uprisings in China inspired by leaders who claimed inspiration from Taoism, Buddhism, or Christianity, and whose religious dissidence was understood by rulers as political dissidence as well. As a consequence, transplanting to China the institutions inspired by the Marxist-Leninist views on religion without taking into consideration Chinese conditions was bound to face difficulties. Social scientists advising the government on religious affairs gave up on the theory of "religion as the opiate (of the masses)" (zongjiao yapianlun 宗教鸦片论) at the beginning of the "reform and 
opening" policy in 1978.
63 A more nuanced understanding of religion could be discussed and serve to orient policies in religious affairs, including the perspective on the "five characteristics" (wuxing 五性) of religion, which had been defended by Li Weihan 李维汉, former director of the Party Central Party School in the 1930s, and which have re-emerged as the basis of the CCP thinking on religious affairs. 64 The "five characteristics" of religion are specific to China and this justifies, in the eyes of its cadres, why the CCP religious work cannot be a mechanistic transplant of the USSR policy. For the proponents of this approach, religion is: long-term (changqi 长期), collective (qunzong 群众), ethnic (minzu 民族), international (guoji 国际) and complex (fuza 复杂). 65 Because religion is a long-term phenomenon, the party must work to ensure its compatibility with socialism. The collective nature of religion suggests that this is not only a matter of individual belief, but also a social reality that requires political and legal management. The ethnic dimension of religion calls for the party to respect the religious beliefs of ethnic minorities if it wants to succeed in its policy of maintaining national unity. Because religions are international, the party must be vigilant to ensure that they uphold the principles of independence, autonomy, and self-governance. Finally, because religion has a complex nature, the party's UFWD must improve its understanding of religious diversity.
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A number of theoretical approaches on religious affairs have emerged over the years, to provide guidance for more specific aspects of religious works. For example, the theory of "religion as culture" (zongjiao wenhua lun 宗教文化论) which emerged in the 1980s, serves as a justification to legitimate the CCP claim to preserve China's traditional culture, without appearing to endorse religion as a rival ideological system. 67 Overall, however, the prevailing view of the "five characteristics" remains the dominant approach guiding party work. This basis for the CCP religious work, as seen above in reference to the CCP policies towards different forms of religiosities, does not imply a uniform framework for the legal supervision of religion. Moreover, as we will see below, it has not precluded the promulgation of different strategies. The same could be said of the party documents that serve to guide policies and laws. The oldest directives 1982 -1987 ) and Zhao Ziyang (1987 -1989 , the CCP considered political as well as economic reforms. However, in the same way economic reforms hurt vested interests in the control of State-Owned Enterprises when the Party envisaged their dismantling, any idea of too relaxed a control over religious believers was bound to affect the interests of cadres who made a career in controlling religious affairs. Illustrative of the difficulties in implementing religious work, the CCP issued in 1985 another policy document, written for and addressed to party organizations, and distributed to members, which addressed problems in the implementation of the previous directives.
70
Moreover, even though Document 19 repudiated the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, it did not reflect new thinking in favour of a secular state where political and religious authorities are separated from each other. Rather, it represented a compromise between the reformist approach embraced by those who supported Hu and Zhao in the direction of gradual political reform, and those who wanted to restore the stability of the authoritarian corporatist mechanism of control put in place in the few years between 1949 and 1966. The different aspects of Document 19 expressed these contradictions within the party. Although some of the paragraphs of Document 19 described freedom of religion in generous terms, the obligation of party members to be atheists represented a serious limitation to the civil and political rights of religious believers because, being barred from joining the party, their participation in state affairs was limited to the public positions that do not require party membership.
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After the June 4th massacre, the CCP religious policy did not repudiate Document 19 but political reform was jettisoned. In the climate of repression 68 Zongjiaoju 宗教局 2012 . 69 CCCCP 1982 . 70 CCCCP 1985 71 The Party prohibits members to join religious organizations but personal beliefs are a different matter.
Politicization of Religion by the CCP that followed the events of 1989, CCP leaders expressed concerns that Chinese converted to Christianity in increasing numbers, and as a result Li Peng, during a 1990 work conference on religious affairs, asked cadres to pay attention to the issue on a daily basis.
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The contradictions between political reformists who had advocated separation between party and state, and their opponents, were "resolved" in favour of the latter, with the issuance in 1991 by the CCP and the CCP Central Committee of a policy document that brought more adjustments to religious work. 73 In 1993, however, Jiang Zemin enunciated his views on the compatibility of religion with socialism. 74 This was an important statement that broke from the classical Marxist perspective predicting the withering away of religion when productive forces are fully developed. This new-found appreciation of the relevance of religion did not mean liberalization, though. In 1994, the State Council, under CCP instructions, promulgated three sets of regulations, about the religious activities of foreign residents, religious venues, and the registration for religious venues. These regulations reminded religious believers that they had to practice their faith within rigorously defined boundaries. Jiang's endorsement of the "compatibility theory" (shiyinglun 适应论) on religion coincided with other bold changes that he promoted in the party, such as the principle of admitting business people in the CCP, which the 16th Party Congress approved formally when it ratified in 2002 the "Theory of the Three Represents". 75 This sequencing of changes constituted another reversal of Marxist orthodoxy, 76 according to which changes in the superstructure of ideology, culture, and religion endorse and legitimate prior changes in the social relations of production. Jiang's approach, while putting changes in the superstructure ahead of changes in society's material base, was not only following on the footsteps of Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic approach, but it was also reproducing the attitude of the state in imperial time, when the monopoly of rites was an extremely important prerogative of rulers whose proper performance was considered the basis of social stability. The latter point was made clear in 2000 in a quite dramatic way when the greatest challenge raised against the regime, from 72 See Li 1990: 195a. I thank an external reviewer for this information. 73 CCCCP and SCPRC 1991. 74 The two other points he stressed were: "correctly handle religious affairs" and "improve the management of religions in accordance with the law". 75 The "important thought of the Three represents" (sangedaibiao zhongyao sixiang 三个代表重 要思想) stipulates that the CCP should represent "advanced social productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people". 76 Mao's voluntarist approach to socialism was a first reversal of classical Marxism.
the perspective of Jiang, was not internal strife within the CCP over the admission of business and entrepreneurs, but a controversy of a religious nature. In July 2000, the seemingly liberal regulatory regime put in place with Document 19 and its amendments could not prevent the CCP form enforcing the worst instance of religious persecution since the Cultural Revolution, with the clampdown against Falungong and other qigong movements. 77 In the same year, the CCP launched two campaigns aiming to show that it remained committed to its engagement to respect freedom of religion. On the one hand, it reiterated that China was implementing the rule of law for registration of religious institutions. On the other hand, it used the same legalistic language to justify its campaign against what it had labelled "dangerous cults". Party cadres enforced instructions from the central leadership to make clear this distinction between the legitimate religions recognized by the state and the others, who were stigmatized as responsible for all ills of society. This distinction, enforced though the Jiang and Hu Jintao administration, remains in force under Xi, as discussed above in reference to the crackdown in the spring of 2014. In 2001, Ye Xiaowen, then director of the SARA, highlighted the main theoretical and policy prescriptions that party cadres needed to know about, in the introduction to an overview of the CCP religious work since 1949. 78 The goal of that publication was to show to the outside world that China takes seriously religious affairs, and is ready to handle them with legal instruments. That document presented three constitutional benchmarks (jizhun 基准) on religion as well as lists of instructions directed at the public, cadres, and scholars working on religious affairs that are still valid in 2014. The "benchmarks" refer to three specific points (yaodian 要点) relevant to religion among the 36 articles of the Constitution: "freedom of religious belief", the "separation of politics and religion" (zhengjiao fenli 政教分离), and the "independence of religion". Although they appear liberal in their wording, they have major limitations. Freedom of religious belief, as most observers have noted, does not guarantee the freedom to practice, and forbids proselytizing. Separation between religion and politics is one-sided: religion should not influence politics, but political leaders, via the CCP UFWD, the State Council's SARA, and mandatory registration in the "patriotic" religious associations, constitute interference in religious affairs. Finally, the independence of religion (duli banjiao 独立办教), obviously curtailed by the above-mentioned state interference, in effect means "religious organizations are not subjected to influence from foreign hostile forces from abroad".
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The CCP guidance on religious work stresses that the public needs to know about four principles (sige yuanze 四个原则), which are the three constitutional provisions just mentioned, in addition to relevant rights and obligations (quanli yu yiwu 权利与义务), 80 along with "four maintenances" (sige weihu 四个维护).
The fourth principle, rights and obligations, serves to remind the public of the CCP particular interpretation of the three constitutional provisions that the public must know about -and underlines the rationale behind the limitations just discussed. The respect for the rights of the public -religious believers and non-believers as well -is conditional on the observance of the following four requirements: observance of the laws, patriotism, support of the socialist path, and approval of CCP leadership. To ensure they enjoy their rights, individuals and organizations -including religious associations -must also observe four duties. That is, they must maintain: people's interest (renmin liyi 人民利益); respect for the law (falu zunyan 法律尊严); unity among ethnic groups (minzu tuanjie 民族团结); and national unification (zuguo tongyi 祖国统一). The last three of these duties are in themselves revealing. The respect for the law, at the time of publication, reflected the CCP's growing interest for the concept of "rule of law", in anticipation of accession to the WTO; the reference to the unity among ethnic groups alluded to increasing concerns over the rise in unrest among minorities; and finally evoking the issue of unification reflects the importance of Taiwan under Jiang, and alludes to the possibility that religious leaders and their followers in Taiwan can work for unification with their counterparts in China. The CCP also instructs its cadres about ten basic points they must uphold. In addition to their respect for the principles of freedom of religion, the promotion of religious organizations' independence -as defined above -the management (guanli 管理) of the separation between the state and religion, and the implementation (zhengchu 正处) of the "four maintenances", they must: be mindful of the importance of religion; implement the united front work; encourage religious groups' patriotism; understand the differences and connections between religious and national minority affairs; and seek to realize the compatibility between religion and socialism. Finally, they must uphold the merits and moral value of atheist education. Along with these ten principles, cadres must keep in mind the three sentences (sanjuhua 三句话) that they should relay to the 79 Ye 2001: 6. 80 The four principles were promulgated in 1998 by Jiang, during a tour in Xinjiang, in Ye 2001: 4. population in general when they want to communicate the CCP policy on religion: China is a country with religious freedom, the management of religion is in accordance with the law, and religion is compatible with socialism, three sayings known as "talk about policies" (jiang zhengce 讲政策), "focus on management" (gua guanli 挂管理), "promote adaptation" (zu shiying 足适应). Finally, cadres are instructed to remind members of the epistemic communities working on religious affairs that they should uphold the viewpoints on the five characteristics of religion discussed above. 82 James Tong saw in the language used by the regulation an end to the managerial approach of the state towards religion. 83 Furthermore, the new regulations' relative placement of measures that favour the protection of religious freedom before measures that restrict it suggested a greater acceptance of religion. 84 The regulation also circumscribed the state scope of intervention to the public dimension of religion, not to individual believers' behaviour, in conformity with international standards. 85 The regulations also removed certification requirement and reduced the number of activities from religious associations needing state approval. 86 The new regulations are included in administrative law (xingzheng fagui 行政法规), however, and therefore they are not considered as authoritative as national laws (falü 法律). To be sure, there was no shortage of external comments to criticise the regulation's shortcomings. 87 Many noted that the CCP had adopted the international standards of religious freedoms in this document, but they have not always implemented the substance of that document in some of its policies.
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During the second mandate of Hu, the CCP, the SARA, and academics met to discuss further the application of the idea that religion is compatible with socialism. Having promoted the agenda of "harmonious society", seen by many as reminiscent of Confucian values, the CCP UFWD came up in 2006 with the "theory on the positive contribution of religions" (zongjiao jiji zuoyong lun 宗教积极作用论). In 2012, a step further was taken in that direction, with the joint promulgation by the CCP's UFWD, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the SARA, of an opinion (yijian 意见) stating that religious associations can engage in public interest work.
89 Although "opinions" have an even lower status than regulations or laws, it is interesting to note that they allow for religious institutions a greater scope of activities than was previously the case.
Although the CCP has moved since the beginning of the reform and opening policy towards an increasing acceptance of religion in general and in particular recognized its compatibility with Chinese contemporary society, there remains some important resistance. Because leaders have insisted since 1989 on presenting an image of unanimity, it is difficult to account for the extent and nature of this resistance. As Beja noted in his analysis on the Chinese democracy movement's failure to prevail in the late 1980s, the CCP has sought since the June 4th massacre to avoid at all cost giving the appearance of division within its own ranks, lest his adversaries would take advantage of perceived weakness to undermine its rule. It is too early to tell whether the ongoing campaign of Xi Jinping against corruption within the CCP is doing damage to the party's pretense of unity. However, if there are divisions within the leadership on religious matters, the evidence so far is scant. The promotion of a positive view on religion, which goes as far as suggesting it can thrive under socialism, co-exist with the opposite view-point that as China modernize, it will wither away while material and scientific progress prevail.
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Under Xi Jinping, and under the direction of Wang Zuo'an in the SARA, many issues remain unresolved in the domain of religious affairs. There are even signs that the politicization of religion is going to give less emphasis on the cooperative side that was embodied with the idea of the compatibility with socialism under Hu Jintao, rather highlighting the more coercive dimension of the politicization, with an accent on the idea of religion as a threat. This is what recent documents on religious work suggest, where the emphasis is on legalization (fazhihua 法治化), not in the sense of a wider application of the rule of law to respect religious freedom, but rather a more comprehensive management of the affairs of religion in accordance with the law. The recent publication of a policy paper on religious work pointed to the following international factors as challenges to religious work: globalization, religious extremism, and the role played by the internet. It also included challenging domestic factors such as the collateral damages of the reform and opening policy like growing inequalities, poverty, along with moral relativism, and decline in public morality. It is revealing of a bias towards a coercive politicization of religion that the strategy 89 Zongjiaoju 宗教局 2012 : 355. 90 Xi 2012 envisaged to ensure these problems do not affect development is more supervision from the CCP.
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This suggests that the state prefers to rely even more on the official religious associations to uphold its policies against cults and foreign interference. 92 The fear of cult is not limited to the qigong movement, but also to movements that claim to be Christian and that are not recognized as such by the official Church. The CCP anxiety over alleged connection between religions in China and socalled "foreign hostile forces" was palpable in the notice from the CCP Central Committee's UFWD, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the SARA, distributed by the General Office of the CCCCP and the General Office of the State Council, to municipalities, municipalities-level and military regiments, about the "foreign use of religion to infiltrate institutes of higher education" and the issue of proselytizing on campus. 93 The fear over foreign infiltration under the name of religion has not abated under the leadership of Xi Jinping: on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches, Wang Zuo'an, the head of the SARA, pointedly reiterated that Chinese Christian theology should be compatible with China's approach to socialism.
94
Yet, within the Chinese epistemic community, there are many voices that offer more nuanced perspectives on religion in world affairs -and therefore on its compatibility with a resurgent China -that could offer their insights if leaders want to develop more cooperative policies. Moreover, different departments and organs of the state, as well as actors in business, civil society, and the religious sector itself, have conflicting interests. It is not clear to what extent the CCP has successfully consolidated its uncontested position as the arbiter of these interests, and to what extent it has totally succeeded in insulating itself from capture by some interests in business and/or the military. The extreme nervousness of Jiang Zemin in 1999 and the swiftness of the campaign against Falungong no doubt relates to that fear that the CCP could be captured by that organization, even though in retrospect that fear looks exaggerated even if Falungong was an important organization, as the range of its membership throughout China and abroad attests. 95 However, the fear that China could be overthrown by a nation-wide, unified political-religious movement remains improbable in the near future because of the huge diversity and complexity of China's religious landscape.
Conclusions
The politicization of religion by the CCP has become increasingly complex and in that sense reflective of China's own religious diversity. The surprising finding is that despite a theoretical commitment to a Marxist-Leninist theory that is premised on the withering away of religion, the guidance for state policy towards religion is inspired by the long institutional memory of the Chinese state's traditional control of religion, which has inspired in turn the more sophisticated idea that religion has five characteristics that should serve as a guide for policy in the long run. According to that perspective, religion is a lasting phenomenon, more than merely a matter of individual choice, a component of ethnic identity, influenced by international trends, and complex in its manifestations. This view represents a more realistic understanding of China's condition than a dogmatic implementation of Marxism-Leninism doctrine would produce. The different approaches adopted by the CCP to take these realities into account have oscillated between cooperative and coercive approaches to the management of religious affairs. What these changes have revealed, though, is that the CCP is taking religion more seriously than its official pronouncements would lead one to believe. This has allowed the CCP to develop policies that are openly supportive of some religions and cooperative, along with others that are more coercive. The cooperative/coercive dichotomy used throughout this essay should not leave the impression that the CCP faces stark choices in dealing with different religions. The practice on the ground is more complex. The cooperative and coercive approaches represent opposite ends of a continuum in which the middle ground is occupied by negotiations, or even a form of benign indifference. To borrow from Robert Weller, writing recently about official policy on religious affairs in China, sometimes the behaviour of the CCP is "governing with one eye open and one eye closed". 96 The recent decision to encourage religious institutions' organization of activities for the public interest suggests a move forward with some important implications. Religious associations are offered an improvement of their status as important partners in different social programs 96 Weller 2014. and relief efforts, but in doing so they also become, for many followers, adherents, and/or faithful, complicit to a political regime they disapprove on religious grounds. It is too early to tell whether this politicization of religion by the state through collaboration can trigger disaffection and exit to other forms of religiosity that are underground or illegal. It is also quite possible that the deepening of cooperative relationship makes religious institutions and their members more fully supportive of the regime.
